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Abstract
This article examines two different approaches seeking to impose human 
rights obligations on corporations: Rights-based approaches and societal 
constitutionalism. Drawing from natural law arguments and from a fundamental 
basis of universal morality, rights-based approaches focus on the human rights 
of the rights holders applying against all those that could infringe upon them. 
On the contrary, societal constitutionalism understands human rights as social 
and legal counter-institutions to the expansionist tendencies of social systems 
and places the emphasis on the need to trigger the internal self-regulatory 
dynamics of corporations. Rights-based approaches favor the establishment 
of legally binding obligations on corporations through an international treaty, 
while societal constitutionalism sees in Corporate Social Responsibility codes 
emerging civil constitution. The article concludes with a nuanced normative 
argument, tailored according to whether the goal sought throughsocial rights 
protection approaches further the distributional imperative of sufficiency or 
equality.
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A. Introduction
According to the prevalent view, the current state of international law 
does not recognize corporations possessing direct human rights obligations.1 
The state-centrism of international law imposes obligations on states that 
flow from human rights instruments. However, the social power possessed by 
transnational corporations and their potential to prejudice human rights2 has 
for decades motivated negotiating processes and attempts at the level of the UN 
to impose some form of human rights standards or obligations on corporate 
activity. The framework that has resulted after previously unsuccessful efforts3 
is the three-pillar Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework, encapsulated in the 
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights of 2011. The 
Guiding Principles (UNGP) first reiterate theinternational human rights law 
obligations of states to protect individuals against human rights abuses within 
their territory, clarifying that this includes the duty to protect against human 
rights abuse by third parties.4 Regarding corporate obligations, the UNGP state 
that corporations, on their part, “[...] should avoid infringing on the human 
rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which 
1  The possibility of providing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with jurisdiction over 
legal persons for the offences listed in the ICC Statute has been repeatedly considered but 
dismissed. For a discussion of the issues that relate to criminal liability of corporations, 
and in particular under the jurisdiction of the ICC, see C. Chiomenti, ‘Corporations and 
the International Criminal Court’ in O. De Schutter (ed.), Transnational Corporations 
and Human Rights (2006). For a heterodox interpretation of international law on the 
matter, see D. Bilchitz, ‘A Chasm Between ‘is’ and ‘ought’? A Critique of the Normative 
Foundations of the SRSG’s Framework and the Guiding Principles’, in S. Deva and D. 
Bilchitz (eds.), Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility 
to Respect? (2013).
2  According to data put together by NGO ‘Global Justice Now’, 157 of top 200 economic 
entities by revenue are corporations not countries, Global Justice Now, ‘69 of the Richest 
100 Entities on the Planet are Corporations, not Governments, Figures Show’ (2018), 
available at https://www.globaljustice.org.uk/news/2018/oct/17/69-richest-100-entities-
planet-are-corporations-not-governments-figures-show (last visited 21 August 2019). 
For a list of claims challenging private business activity already from 2001, see S. R. 
Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’, 111 Yale 
Law Journal (2001) 3, 443, 446 - 447.
3  For a history of the debate and previous efforts, including the UN draft Norms of 2003, 
see O. De Schutter, ‘The Challenge of Imposing Human Rights Norms on Corporate 
Actors’ in Olivier De Schutter (ed.), Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (2006).
4  UNHRC, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN Doc HR/PUB/11/04, 2011, I. A. 
1.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3522165
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3393480 
541CSR and Social Rights
they are involved [...]”.5 A core obligation in this regard is for corporations to 
conduct human rights due diligence.6 Attempting to harness already existing 
risk assessment processes within corporations, John Ruggie, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises (SRSG) and leading figure behind 
the adoption of the UNGP, understands human rights due diligence as “[...]
a process whereby companies not only ensure compliance with national laws 
but also manage the risk of human rights harm with a view to avoiding it [...]”.7 
Yet, the obligation to respect human rights and conduct due diligence is not a 
legal obligation, carrying no sanctions for failure of compliance and drawing 
its normative force from social expectations and the subsequent “[...] courts of 
public opinion [...]”.8 The last pillar is the obligation of States to ensure access of 
victims of human rights abuses by third parties to an effective remedy.9
Despite broad consensus around the UNGP from various stakeholders, 
including States and corporations alike, criticism of the Protect, Respect, Remedy 
Framework has also been widespread. The non-binding nature of the UNGP 
has been the major focus of critique, including normative arguments on the 
understanding of human rights per se, as well as arguments of inadequacy, 
excessive attachment to pragmatism and strategic considerations, and weak 
implementation mechanisms.10 These critical voices played an important role 
5  Ibid., II. A. 11.
6  Ibid., II. B. 17.
7  Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Protect, Respect and 
Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, 
9, para. 25. Companies should identify the human rights challenges in the countries they 
operate, as well as the impacts their own activities may have within that context and to 
what extent they might contribute to abuse (para. 57). They should also adopt a human 
rights policy, integrate it throughout the company, and track its performance, in addition 
to policies that facilitate remediation of adverse human rights impact (para. 60-63).
8  Ibid., para. 54. These comprise of “[...] employees, communities, consumers, civil society, 
as well as investors [...]”.
9  UNHRC, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, supra note 4, III. A. 25.
10  Indicatively, for an overall critique see D. Bilchitz & S. Deva, ‘The Human Rights 
Obligations of Business: A Critical Framework for the Future’ in S. Deva & D. Bilchitz 
(eds), Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? 
(2013). For a critique of inadequacy of the soft framework, see J.-M. Kamatali, ‘The New 
Guiding Principles on Human Rights´  Contribution in Ending the Devising Debate 
Over Human Rights Responsibilities of Companies: Is It Time for an ICJ Advisory 
Opinion?’, 20 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law (2012) 2, 437. For 
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in the adoption in 2014 of a UN Resolution, originally drafted by Ecuador 
and South Africa, establishing an intergovernmental working groupwith the 
goal of drafting an international legally binding instrument on corporations 
and human rights.11 Motivated by this goal, the working group presented a Zero 
Draft of a Treaty and an Optional Protocol in July 2018 and a Revised Draft in 
July 2019. The purpose of this article is to examine the two different theoretical 
approaches that underpin the legal instruments and mechanisms seeking to 
impose human rights obligations on corporate actors: Rights-based approaches 
and societal constitutionalism. While the context is that of international law, 
both theoretical endeavors discussed involve a normative substratum that would 
also make them applicable to national law. Through the juxtaposition of societal 
constitutionalism and rights-based approaches, I aim to contribute to the debate 
around the human rights obligations of corporations, especially regarding socio-
economic rights, as well as to elucidate the genealogy and practical implications 
of two distinct ways of approaching the issue of constraining corporate power in 
the context of globalization. In practice, the article is inspired by and addresses 
the current opposition in the field of business and human rights between the 
proponents of strengthening legal accountability for corporations through a new 
treaty and those defending the UNGP and the effort to embed social values in 
companies.
My argument is that the attachment to the UNGP and the zeal for a new, 
binding treaty correspond to different philosophical approaches in thinking 
about rights and the State in the context of globalization. The UNGP framework 
constitutes a polycentric approach that tries to uncover nodes of normativity in 
the interactions between States, business, and civil society, in a way that parallels 
the theoretical basis of societal constitutionalism and its prioritization o reflexiviy 
in questions of law, regulation, and political economy. Before unpacking this in 
a critique of the UNGP being overly driven by the need to achieve consensus, sacrificing 
part of the normative understanding of human rights, see S. Deva, ‘Treating Human 
Rights Lightly: A Critique of the Consensus Rhetoric and the Language Employed by 
the Guiding Principles’ in S. Deva and D. Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights Obligations of 
Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? (2013). For a critique by civil 
society regarding insufficient implementation mechanisms, see Human Rights Watch, 
‘UN Human Rights Council: Weak Stance on Business Standards’ (2011), available at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/16/un-human-rights-council-weak-stance-business-
standards (last visited 15 October 2019).
11  Elaboration of an International Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises With Respect to Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/26/L.22/
Rev.1, 25 June 2014.
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the following sections, it is worth drawing attention to the fact that societal 
constitutionalism understands change and evolution to be happening within 
social systems (such as corporations or industries), rather than enforced upon 
them, thus underpinning the notion that enhanced social responsibility of private 
actors must come through their internal constitutions. On the other hand, the 
attempt to establish legally binding obligations for corporations through an 
international treaty rests on a state-centered understanding of law and normativity, 
as well as on the moral imperative of recognizing and remedying human rights 
violations. In that sense, the quest for a Binding Treaty on Business and Human 
Rights is interlinked with rights-based approaches regarding corporate human 
rights obligations. Indeed, drawing from natural law arguments, rights-based 
approaches focus on the human rights of the rights-holders applying against all 
those that could infringe upon them, while they accentuate the importance of 
legal obligations and external regulation of corporate conduct, as opposed to 
triggering change within the internal structures of social systems.
For the purposes of this article, I examine the rationales and ramifications 
of these two approaches not only regarding socio-economic rights (or simple 
social rights), even if these remain a centripetal force and a point of reference for 
this article. Rather, I examine the theoretical approaches behind the horizontality 
of human rights obligations in general, for civil, political, and social rights alike, 
because the arguments invoked in both approaches call for a uniform effect 
of all categories of rights. These arguments in favor of the horizontal effect 
of human rights obligations arise from three shared lines of reasoning: (a) A 
sociological/empirical observation of the rise of private power, (b) a specific 
concept of rights, and (c) a specific view on the nature of the corporation. As I 
will show, both rights-based approaches and societal constitutionalism share the 
observation of the rise of private power and find significant common ground on 
the conceptualization of the corporation as an – at least on a normative level – 
not entirely private entity. Yet, they diverge significantly on their understanding 
of rights, which, unsurprisingly, structures different understandings of the 
role of the State, regulation, and international politics. The prime goal of the 
article is to use the comparison between rights-based approaches and societal 
constitutionalism not to offer a straightforward normative suggestion for future 
regulatory frameworks, but to contribute to the relevant on-going discussions 
by suggesting a level of abstraction that allows for further contextualization 
and a deeper understanding of the connotations and implications of different 
approaches in favor of imposing human rights obligations on corporations. 
Beyond this original priority, I do attempt a nuanced normative outlook, tailoring 
it, however, to the goal that is sought. If the goal of human rights protection, 
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and especially social rights materialization, is the distribution imperative of 
sufficiency, meaning guaranteeing a floor of protection against deprivation, then 
rights-based approaches appear more immune to risks of market capture and co-
option than societal constitutionalism, while they better accommodate concerns 
of democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, I acknowledge that societal 
constitutionalism, if operationalized differently than its current proponents are 
attempting, holds significant promise for a distribution imperative that is closer 
to aspirations of equality, understood as the erasure of hierarchies and relative 
differences in the possession of the good things in life.
Part II of the article discusses the competing rationales in favor of human 
rights obligations for corporate actors. It is divided into one section for each 
approach, where each section examines the views of each approach on the 
purpose of rights and the nature of the corporation respectively. Part III focuses 
on the different operationalizations of the suggested horizontal effect of human 
rights. While rights-based approaches place increasing emphasis on the need 
of an international binding treaty (Section A), societal constitutionalism sees 
the dynamics of self-limitation of corporations emerging through transnational 
communicative processes as the key to controlling the centrifugal dynamics of 
the economy, highlighting the role Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can 
play in that regard (Section B). The article concludes with some reflections on 
the potential of synergy between the two approaches and with the nuanced 
normative position outlined above.
B. Two Competing Rationales in Favor of Human   
 Rights Obligations of Corporate Actors
I. Rights-Based Approaches
Rights-based approaches are by predisposition oriented towards a moral 
understanding of rights as commanding obligations regardless of the scope of 
the law.12 It is from this cognitive claim to universal morality, associated with 
dignity, freedom, and autonomy, that rights-based approaches commence to 
construct their normative edifice regarding the need to interpret current positive 
12  See, for example, F. Wettstein, ‘CSR and the Debate on Business and Human Rights: 
Bridging the Great Divide’, 22 Business Ethics Quarterly (2012) 4, 739, 740 citing A. Sen, 
‘Elements of a Theory of Human Rights’, 32 Philosophy & Public Affairs (2004) 4, 315, 
321 according to whom human rights are “[...] quintessentially ethical articulations, and 
they are not, in particular, putative legal claims [...]”.
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law13 or expand it in such a manner that corporations become obligation-holders. 
Rights-based approaches supplement this philosophical foundation with a view 
on the corporation that challenges shareholder primacy.
1. The Purpose of Rights
Why should corporations be bound by international human rights law? 
To answer this question of normative orientation, the rights-based approaches 
commence with an empirical/sociological observation of the rise of private power 
and its influence on large segments of the global population. Corporations, it 
is concluded, can severely and adversely impact on human rights, while, at the 
same time, they are not normatively bound by the constraints these impose, 
other than what has been translated into domestic legislation and regulations. 
This tension intensifies when one is confronted with a fundamental question 
behind the concept of human rights: What is the foundation, the raison d’ être of 
rights? The answer that most elegantly aligns with the drive to make corporations 
rights-bound is that rights are important and justified because of the interests 
they safeguard, namely liberty and well-being.14 This is an approach that starts 
with the desired consequences that rights can achieve. Building on the distinctly 
Dworkinian premise that “[...] each individual’s life is to be treated as being of 
equal importance to that of every other individual [...]”,15 as well as on the claim 
that certain conditions are necessary for individuals to realize “[...] lives of value 
[...]”,16 rights-based approaches underline the purpose of rights with regards to 
individual lives. That purpose of guaranteeing liberty and well-being can only 
be fulfilled if rights apply against everyone. Taking into consideration the social 
13  See, Bilchitz, ‘A Chasm Between ‘is’ and ‘ought’? A Critique of the Normative Foundations 
of the SRSG’s Framework and the Guiding Principles’, supra note 1, 113 on why existing 
human rights treaties should be understood to bind corporations legally. See also, 
Wettstein, ‘CSR and the Debate on Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Great 
Divide’, supra note 12, 743 who brings up the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which “[...]even though principally focusing on nation-states, does not exclude other 
institutions as duty bearers, but explicitly states in its preamble that it applies to ‘every 
individual and every organ of society’[...]”. Same in D. Weissbrodt, ‘Corporate Human 
Rights Responsibilities’, 6 Journal of Business, Economics, and Ethics (2005), 279, 285.
14  D. Bilchitz, ‘Corporations and the Limits of State-Based Models for Protecting 
Fundamental Rights in International Law’, 23 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
(2016), 143, 147. 
15  D. Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-
Economic Rights (2007), 58. 
16  Ibid., 58.
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reality of private power, if rights were to burden only the State with obligations 
then they would fail to fulfill their purpose of guaranteeing individuals these 
fundamental interests.
On the contrary, if rights are justified in a non-consequentialist way, then 
their horizontal effect does not necessarily follow. Even though dignity and 
the inherent worth of individuals are powerful foundations for human rights, 
they do not unequivocally lead to the conclusion that obligations flowing from 
those rights should burden private actors.17 Status theories of rights, drawing 
from the Kantian imperative against treating humans as means to an end, focus 
on the inalienability of rights and see them as side constraints on the pursuit 
of even desired consequences.18 Such deontological approaches may say little 
about how the rights should be rendered functional – in fact, they emphasize a 
paradigm of autonomy and non-interference associated with liberty.19 This non-
interference with the enjoyment of natural rights may mean that social power, 
also accrued in the process of the enjoyment of rights (such as the right to liberty 
and right to property) remains unrecognized. This seems to be a point that 
rights-based approaches, in their effort to strike a balance between deontological 
and consequentialist approaches to rights – exemplified in the cornerstones of 
liberty an well-being – have underestimated. Rights are not only the privilege of 
those that might feel the consequences of private power, but they can in fact be 
constitutive of private power themselves. For instance, David Bilchitz discusses 
the example of a corporation strictly limiting the freedom of expression of 
employees.20 From a consequentialist perspective, it follows that the only way to 
make the right to freedom of expression meaningful in this case is to allow for 
a certain degree of horizontality. From a deontological – natural law perspective 
on the other hand, it could be counter-argued that the employer makes use 
of his or her liberty of contract, a right recognized as a natural right already 
by Grotius.21 As employees enter willingly into contract liberty appears to be a 
17  See, in this sense the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, Preamble, 
affirming the “[...] faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person and in the equal rights of men and women [...]”.
18  R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (2013), 29.
19  See, ibid., 27, citing John Locke’s claim that the bounds of the law of nature require that 
“[...] no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions [...]”.
20  Bilchitz, ‘Corporations and the Limits of State-Based Models for Protecting Fundamental 
Rights in International Law’, supra note 14, 147.
21  R. Pound, ‘Liberty of Contract’, 18 Yale Law Journal (1909) 7, 454, 455. It is important 
to note that this analysis leaves out the important topic of fundamental rights of 
corporations. For an overview in comparative perspective, P. Oliver, ‘Companies and 
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two-sided coin, not necessarily leading to direct human rights obligations of 
corporations.22
It is, therefore, rather the latter purpose of rights well-being, that fuels 
the call for horizontality of human rights, especially when the focus is on social 
right. Well-being necessarily implies a vision of good life, highlighting the vital 
and essential quality of certain aspects of the human experience. Despite the 
debates and disagreements around the capabilities approach and the variations 
betwen thin and thick theories of the good,23 rights-based approaches that aim 
to extend the application of the binding force of human rights to corporations 
recognize a common ground of value for individual. Well-being becomes, 
therefore, an objective category that is foundational of obligations for all that 
might be infringing upon it, including instances of private power. An element of 
objectivity is necessary for the focus on the rights-holder to lead to the implied 
recognition of the horizontal obligation to respect his or her human rights that 
guarantee precisely this – perhaps minimum – objective level of well-being. 
A relativistic dismissal of the notion of the good leads to the impossibility to 
discern any extra-legal obligations other than those of non-interference. Why, to 
return to the example of freedom of expression, should a company be required 
to tailor its speech codes directed toward the maximum freedom of expression 
for its employees and not resort to liberty of contract, if there is no recognition 
that freedom of expression makes part of an objective order of values necessary 
for individuals’ well-being? Or, on the level of positive obligations, why should a 
pharmaceutical company be required to give free access to life-saving medication 
their Fundamental Rights: A Comparative Perspective’, 64 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly (2015) 3, 661.
22  Alternatively, it can lead to a restriction of corporate obligations only to ‘negative’ duties, 
meaning avoiding the infringement upon individual rights, see S. R. Ratner, ‘Corporations 
and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’, supra note 2, 517.
23  Only indicatively, see M. C. Nussbaum, ‘Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense 
of Aristotelian Essentialism’ 20 Political Theory (1992) 2, 202, defending essentialism as 
the view that human life has certain defining features that merit protection. See, also A. 
Sen, ‘Human Rights and Capabilities’, 6 Journal of Human Development (2005) 2, 151, 
drawing from Rawlsian ‘objectivity’ in ethics, even though Sen and Nussbaum’s approach 
is already meant to take more note of the diversity of human experience, as opposed to 
Rawls’ resourcist approach. Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights, supra note 15, 17, 
supports a thin theory of the good that aims to give even more weight to the diversity of 
human experience.
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to the poor, if there is no recognition that the right to life and to health constitute 
a common ground of value?24
2. The Nature of the Corporation
The second line of argument as to why corporations should be bound by 
human rights goes back to the nature of the corporation. According to Ruggie, 
it is precisely the nature of the corporation as a “[...] specialized economic 
organ [...]” not a “[...] democratic public interest institution [...]”, that leads to 
the restricted nature of its duties with respect to human rights.25 This position 
reiterates in a moderate way the predominantly private nature of corporations, 
while acknowledging the importance of their function in society, from which 
their limited human rights obligations are derived. However, according to rights-
based approaches, corporations cannot be conceived as entirely private but instead 
as partialyl public entities and genuine carriers of remedial responsibility. Florian 
Wettstein, drawing from a number of political philosophers, underlines that 
remedial responsibility is proportionate to an agent’s capabilities.26 Considering 
that the positive duties to protect and realize the moral claims that make up 
human rights burden the moral community of human beings as a whole, those 
agents with increased capabilities have increased responsibility towards the 
fulfilment of these moral claims.27 Bilchitz, drawing from social-contract theory, 
suggests that the State’s reason for being is to guarantee certain human rights 
and therefore, it legitimizes corporations only to the extent they have a social 
purpose and can bring benefits to society.28
Even though there seems to be a distinct disagreement over the nature 
of the corporation between the views that inspired the UNGP and the views 
of rights-based approaches aspiring to a new binding treaty on business and 
human rights, their differences seem to a certain extent bridgeable when the 
issue is examined on the level of corporate governance. That is because both 
views can, with different degrees of intensity, be placed under the auspices of 
24  Example drawn from D. Bilchitz, ‘Do Corporations Have Positive Fundamental Rights 
Obligations?’, 57 Theoria (2010) 125, 1, 2.
25  Ruggie, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights’, 
supra note 7, para. 53.
26  Wettstein, ‘CSR and the Debate on Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Great 
Divide’, supra note 12, 753.
27  Ibid.
28  Bilchitz, ‘Corporations and the Limits of State-Based Models for Protecting Fundamental 
Rights in International Law’, supra note 14, 163-164.
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the stakeholder approach in corporate governance. This approach contends that 
the interests of stakeholders, that is, “[...] persons or groups with legitimate 
interests in procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity [...]” are 
of “[...] intrinsic value [...]” and “[...] merit consideration [...]” by the corporation 
regardless of instrumental considerations.29 Stakeholder theory might benefit from 
instrumental considerations that relate to strategic management as a component 
of improved performance,30 but it is also supported by normative justifications 
that arise from the interdependencies of the corporation with various groups 
and communities.31 Contrary to the dominant view of shareholder primacy, 
which asserts that the sole responsibility of business is to maximize returns for 
shareholders,32 stakeholder theory adopts an evolving understanding of property 
rights as embedded in human rights and carrying restrictions with respect to the 
interests of others.33
However, if stakeholder theory recognizes the partially social purpose of 
the corporation and thus commands some level of human rights obligations of 
corporations, it is flexible enough to allow for the accommodation of both the 
soft agenda of the UNGP and the more demanding normative framework of 
rights-based approaches. What separates the rights-based approaches further is 
their implicit recognition of the concession theory of corporate personality.34 In 
other words, in their effort to provide philosophical foundations for the human 
rights obligations of corporate actors, rights-based approaches underscore that 
29  See, T. Donaldson & L. E. Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: 
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications’ 20 Academy of Management Review (1995), 1, 67.
30  E.g., R. E. Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (1984) 96-98.
31  See, Donaldson and Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, 
Evidence, and Implications’, supra note 29, 81-82, citing American Law Institute, 
‘Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations’ (1992) 80, 
“Corporate officials are not less morally obliged than any other citizens to take ethical 
considerations into account, and it would be unwise social policy to preclude them from 
doing so.”
32  See for example, M. Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase 
Its Profits’, in W. C. Zimmerli, K. Richter & M. Holzinger (eds), Corporate Ethics and 
Corporate Governance (2007) 173.
33  Donaldson & Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, 
and Implications’, supra note 29, 83-84. This view is further legitimized by the fact that 
even strong defendants of property rights accept limitations to property rights. See, for 
example, Nozick’s example of the appropriation of the single waterhole in the desert and 
the worsening of the position of others. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, supra note 18, 
140.
34  E.g., Bilchitz, ‘Do Corporations Have Positive Fundamental Rights Obligations?’, supra 
note 24.
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corporations are fundamentally State creations that can be regulated on the 
basis of the public interest – rather than corporations being the aggregate of 
natural persons with the rights to resist regulation.35 It is State law that enables 
the benefits of the corporate form, including limited liability and perpetual 
succession, and it is precisely because of the social purpose of the corporation to 
fulfill certain functions in society that these advantages are granted. Reversing 
the equation and adopting a consequentialist perspective that aims to constrain 
corporations, it is only possible to justify the demand for corporations to be 
good citizens and assume their remedial responsibility if the corporation is seen 
as having a separate personality. Indeed, social responsibility cannot arise from 
merely an aggregate of shareholders.36 Concession theory of corporate personality 
emerges as a justification of and aligns itself with stakeholder theory on the level 
of governance, leading to the treatment of corporate governance as a “[...] species 
of public law [...]”.37
II. Societal Constitutionalism
Societal constitutionalism aims to provide an answer to the conundrum 
of how to constrain global capitalism in the absence of global democratic 
institutions. Imagining constitutionalization without the State, societal 
constitutionalism posits the emergence of a multiplicity of civil constitutions 
beyond the representative institutions of international politics.38 The challenge 
35  S. Padfield, ‘Rehabilitating Concession Theory’, 66 Oklahoma Law Review (2014) 2, 327, 
333-337.
36  This was recognized early by E. M. Dodd in his exchanges with A. Berle. See, E. M. 
Dodd, ‘For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?’, 45 Harvard Law Review (1932) 
7, 1145; E. M. Dodd, ‘Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate 
Managers Practicable?’, 2 University of Chicago Law Review (1935) 194.
  It is important to highlight that rights-based approaches challenge shareholder primacy 
while focusing on corporate personality. They do not engage with the inverse critical 
perspective that aims to challenge the ‘Limited Liability – Shareholder Primacy’ dualism 
by suggesting a return to unlimited liability and thus an attenuation of corporate 
personality. For the relevant discussion of the two possible critiques of the current 
priorities of company law, see P. Ireland, ‘Limited Liability, Shareholder Rights and the 
Problem of Corporate Irresponsibility’, 34 Cambridge Journal of Economics (2010) 5, 837.
37  S. Padfield, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory’, 6 William & Mary 
Business Law Review (2015), 1, 24-25, citing S. M. Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy: The 
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’, 97 Northwestern University Law Review 
(2003) 2, 547, 549.
38  G. Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional 
Theory?’, in C. Joerges, I. Sand & G. Teubner (eds), Transnational Governance and 
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then becomes for these sub-constitutions to combat the centrifugal dynamics of 
social subsystems in global society.39
1. The Purpose of Rights
To understand how societal constitutionalism conceives rights, it is 
necessary to take a step back and view the entirety of society through the lenses 
of systems theory. According to systems theory, society is made up of social 
systems that are defined by boundaries between themselves and the environment. 
Systems consist of communications that are self-referential, being determined by 
themselves and determining themselves.40 However, self-referentiality does not 
contradict the system’s openness to the environment. Systems remain responsive 
to the increasing complexity of the environment by translating this complexity 
into their own functionally differentiated form of communication. Change, 
learning and evolution are not excluded, but redefined to be understood as 
happening within the system.41
This prompts a broader project of social transformation based on the 
internal functioning of social (sub)systems. Acknowledging the functional 
differentiation of contemporary society, reflexive law was conceived as a shift 
from substantive law, aiming to achieve social co-ordination not by centralized, 
top-down regulation, but by enhancing the self-reflecting capacities and 
promoting the self-limitation of social systems.42 According to Gunther Teubner, 
“[...] law realizes its own reflexive orientation insofar as it provides the structural 
premises for reflexive processes in other social subsystems [...]”.43 Since society 
has no center, law’s production needs to be decentralized to better respond to 
the changing societal needs, allowing for system self-governance, flexibility, 
experimentation, and learning. In that direction, societal constitutionalism 
emphasizes the need to strengthen the democratic potential of the social sub-
Constitutionalism (2004), 1, 8.
39  G. Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization 
(2012), 4.
40  N. Luhmann, Social Systems (1995), 61-62.
41  G. Teubner, ‘Introduction to Autopoietic Law’, in G. Teubner (ed.), Autopoietic law: A 
New Approach to Law and Society (1987), 1, 7-8.
42  See, in general, G. Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’, 17 Law 
& Society Review (1983), 239.
43  Ibid., 275. In Teubner’s later work, this is taken to include the possibility of dissent, 
which in the social system of the economy could for example mean ethics commissions 
and external mechanisms of support for whistleblowers. See, Teubner, Constitutional 
Fragments, supra note 39, 89.
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areas.44 In sharp contrast to the morality-inspired justifications presented above, 
the lack of a center of society further insinuates that there is neither a common 
morality according to which social systems operate, nor the universal reason 
that will provide grounds for legitimation structures; instead, legitimacy is a 
mere mode of reproduction for social systems.45 Systems theory, as well as its 
progenies reflexive law and societal constitutionalism, relocate the focus from 
the supposedly self-determining individual and the subsequent normative 
aspirations of modernity, to anonymous matrices of communication, which 
individuals simply make a part of.
Does this mean that rights, traditionally conceived as belonging to the 
rights-holder as translations of pre-legal moral claims, are obsolete? On the 
contrary, human rights are integral in this decentered conceptualization of 
society; nevertheless, not because of the fundamentality of the affected legal 
interests, but because they function“[...] as social and legal counter-institutions to 
theexpansionist tendencies of social systems [...]”.46 Human rights are not about 
intersubjective relations but about “[...] the dangers to the integrity of institutions, 
persons and individuals that are created by anonymous communicative matrices 
[...]”.47 Rights are not addressed against the State but against political power.48 
This approach is consistent both with the descriptive understanding of society 
as made up of autopoietic social systems, law being one of them, and with the 
normative aspect of reflexive law and societal constitutionalism expressed in the 
idea of triggering the self-limitation of social systems in order to prevent them 
from expanding their rationalities to a degree that it would create unsurmountable 
problems to other functional systems. Indeed, a necessary ramification of the 
autopoiesis of the legal system is that it produces its own social reality and that 
its legal operations produce human actors as “[...] semantic artefacts [...]”.49 At 
44  G. Teubner, ‘Transnational Fundamental Rights: Horizontal Effect?’, 40 Netherlands 
Journal of Legal Philosophy (2011) 3, 191, 206.
45  According to Luhmann, the question of legitimacy as a moral condition about the 
conditions of exercise of political power is tied to a metaphysical view of the world that 
assumes a generalized human consciousness, an ultimate point of reference of claims to 
Truth, not unlike premodern metaphysical philosophy. See, N. Luhmann, Soziologische 
Aufklärung I (1970), 159. For an excellent overview of Luhmann’s understanding of 
legitimacy, see C. Thornhill, ‘Niklas Luhmann: A Sociological Transformation of Political 
Legitimacy?’, 7 Journal of Social Theory (2011) 2, 33.
46  Teubner, ‘Transnational Fundamental Rights: Horizontal Effect?’, supra note 44, 210.
47  Ibid.
48  Teubner, Constitutional Fragments, supra note 39, 132.
49  G. Teubner, ‘How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law’, 23 
Law & Society Review (1989) 5, 727, 730. Yet, this does not mean that human actors 
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the same time, human rights are an integral part of the reflexive structures that 
are necessary to prevent the expansionist tendencies of social systems, including 
the economy. The horizontal effect of human rights logically follows from these 
assumptions, along with the recognition that the state-centered view of rights or 
their conceptualization as spheres of individual autonomy cannot be sustained. 
Besides, Teubner espouses the view that natural law arguments, not dissimilar 
to the ones presented above, cannot withstand the test of pluralism and diversity 
of human experience and beliefs.50
The purpose of rights is then, according to Teubner, double-edged: 
Both inclusionary, in including the population in the political processes, and 
exclusionary, in their effect of demarcating non-political arenas from the political 
field.51 This means that human rights both guarantee the inclusion of the entirety 
of the population into all function systems, while they also protect areas of 
autonomy from these systems. As a result, human rights are both constitutive 
of sub-constitutions of social subsystems by guaranteeing their autonomy and 
they act as factors of self-limitation, restraining the expanding logic of system 
dynamics. Fundamentally, however, especially to the extent socio-economic 
rights are concerned, human rights operate as the entrance gates for the entirety 
of the population into functional systems. Therefore, societal constitutionalism 
views human rights as the guarantor of access to institutions and resources for 
the entirety of the population.
2. The Nature of the Corporation
Societal constitutionalism anchors its normative orientation significantly 
on the question of constitutionalizing polycontexturality. Transcending 
binary distinctions of public/private, societal constitutionalism points out the 
fragmentation of society and the need for a multiplicity of perspectives of self-
description. This approach has an effect on both the understanding of politics 
and the economy. On one hand, polycontexturality means that social systems 
should not be allowed to express solely private rationalities. Instead, they should 
be infused with public rationalities, whereby public means the relation of the 
are reduced to the one-dimensional semantic artefact of the person. Acknowledging the 
complex interrelations between the social person, the psyche, and the body, a systems 
theory perspective recognizes an institutional, a personal, and an individual dimension 
of human rights, see G. Teubner, ‘The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by 
‘Private’ Transnational Actors’, 69 The Modern Law Review (2006) 327, 327.
50  Teubner, ‘Constitutional Fragments’, supra note 39, 125.
51  Ibid., 132-134.
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system to the entirety of society. Human rights protection is such a public 
rationality. On the other hand, the private should be seen as an obstacle to 
what Teubner characterizes as the “[...] unstoppable growth of the welfare state 
[...]”, transforming social activities into public services.52 This type of double 
movement of de-economizing and de-politicizing is meant to both restrain the 
centrifugal dynamics of social systems and to prevent the totalizing presence 
of the public through state regulation of social activities. Law is meant to 
intervene in order to sustain this delicate balance between social responsibility 
and self-realization.53 As the singularity of reason of modernity has faded, the 
constellation of partial rationalities enables both the self-constitution of social 
systems and coordination between them.
Therefore, the economic system should not be allowed to incorporate 
only economic rationalities. At the level of their autopoietic self-description, 
social subsystems should already incorporate a mix of partial rationalities, both 
private and public. The subsequent break with the distinctly private character of 
corporations is reminiscent of rights-based approaches of imposing human rights 
obligations on corporate actors. Societal constitutionalism, nevertheless, takes 
a different turn, shifting the focus on the internal workings of organizations. 
Corporations should, already as part of their internal processes and irrespective 
of state regulation, take into consideration their normative effects on society at 
large. The parallels of this theoretical approach to corporate self-limitation and 
the approach of Ruggie, manifested in the UNGP, are already discernible. Yet, 
the breadth and transformative potential of polycontexturality is too large to 
be confined to processes of economic self-regulation. This is because societal 
constitutionalism, drawing from the tradition of reflexive law, goes beyond 
the need to establish self-reflective (and hence self-limiting) structures within 
organizations; in fact, a prerequisite for genuine self-reflection is the existence of 
discursive structures within social systems in the direction of an organizational 
democracy. Indeed, societal constitutionalism is, in theory, a project of 
democratization not only of institutionalized politics, but of the entirety of 
social spheres; crucially, however, this process of democratization should take 
place internally within social systems. Furthermore, it is not proper to transfer 
the democratic institutions and procedures that have been associated with the 
52  G. Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism and the Politics of the Common’, 21 Finnish 
Yearbook of International Law (2010) 111, 113-114. Teubner places the emphasis around 
his disagreement with A. Negri especially on the notion of public, highlighting the need 
to resist the idea that a unified political collective can represent society.  
53  Ibid., 5.
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political system to all social arenas; instead, every social subsystem should find 
its own way to democratization.54 Hence, corporations, as social subsystems of 
the economic system, need to be democratized from within. The role of the state 
is to produce such a framework that will generate the internal forces that are 
necessary to generate self-reflective structures and the subsequent self-limitation.
III. Recapping the Comparative Analysis
Before examining the different operationalizations of human rights 
obligations that rights-based approaches and societal constitutionalism point 
toward, it is worth recapping the main points drawn from this comparative 
analysis. While both rights-based approaches and societal constitutionalism 
stress the importance of the horizontal effects of human rights, they differ 
fundamentally in their presuppositions. Rights-based approaches build on a 
moral understanding of rights as commanding obligations flowing from the 
rights-holders themselves. Rights are important to concretize lives of value 
and to safeguard individual liberty and well-being. On the contrary, societal 
constitutionalism perceives rights as institutions, the function of which is to limit 
the expansionist tendencies of social systems, including corporations, industries, 
and the economy more broadly. Furthermore, rights-based approaches conceive 
corporations as not entirely private entities but as partially public, having been 
created by and enjoying special benefits thanks to the State. This is meant as a 
legitimation of external regulation of corporate conduct by public institutions. 
Societal constitutionalism takes the notion of public nature of corporations 
into a different direction, suggesting that all social systems need to incorporate 
public rationalities within their inner workings. These theoretical divergences 
inform different conceptualizations of how human rights obligations are to 
be operationalized, with rights-based approaches stressing the importance of 
external regulation and a determined scope of legal obligations and societal 
constitutionalism highlighting the need for internal corporate transformation 
and coordination of multiple actors in conditions of complexity.
54  Ibid., 13.
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C. The Different Operationalizations of Corporate   
 Human Rights Obligations
I. Rights-Based Approaches: The Example of the Draft Treaty  
 on Business and Human Rights
Considering that human rights correspond to primordial moral claims, 
rights-based approaches place increasing emphasis on the notion of bindingness 
and see the UNGP Framework and its soft nature as necessitating amendment. 
On the level of international law,55 this shift towards harder instruments is meant 
to come through an international treaty. Indeed, the Revised Draft of the Treaty 
on Business and Human Rights provides in its preamble that all businesses shall 
respect human rights by both avoiding adverse human rights impacts and by 
addressing such impacts when they occur.56 Yet, the Draft maintains a state-
centered approach, attributing the primary responsibility for human rights 
protection to States.57 It purports to strengthen human rights protection and 
access to justice and remedy for victims of violations in the context of business 
activities, particularly those of transnational character.58 Socio-economic rights 
fall within the ambit of the Draft, which aims to cover “[...] all human rights 
55  Rights-based approaches are not restricted to embedding human rights obligations for 
corporations in international law. In national (or supranational) law, this could take 
the form of legislation, along the lines of the French Duty of Vigilance Law of 2017. It 
could also take the form of horizontal effect of constitutional provisions, as is for example 
famously the case in South Africa. Indicatively, on the question of social rights, see the 
recent Daniels v. Scribante and Another (CCT50/16) [2017] ZACC 13 establishing direct 
horizontality on the grounds of dignity, following to a significant extent the rights-based 
approaches presented in this article.
56  Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Revised Draft, 16 July 2019, 
Preamble.
57  Contrary to the original contemplation of a binding international enforcement 
mechanism, the Zero Draft treaty relied on the enforcement by states and monitoring 
by a committee of experts. The primary responsibility for human rights remains with 
the states. D. Cassel, At Last: A Draft UN Treaty on Business and Human Rights (2018), 
available at https://lettersblogatory.com/2018/08/02/at-last-a-draft-un-treaty-on-
business-and-human-rights/ (last visited 27 August 2019).
58  Revised Draft, supra note 56, Art. 2, 3, 4. The earlier Zero Draft was criticized for 
attempting to only regulate transnational activities of business enterprises. The Revised 
Draft clarified that the proposed treaty will cover all business enterprises, maintaining 
nevertheless a special focus on transnational corporate activity.
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[...]”,59 even though there is no provision for positive obligations of corporations 
besides cases of violations. The attempt to place victims of human rights violations 
in the foreground conveys the focus of rights-based approaches on individuals as 
holders of legal and moral claims. Beyond a functionalist approach that would 
only target the mechanics of institutional change, the Draft Treaty seeks to place 
concrete individuals and their suffering at the center of the quest for corporate 
accountability.60
Core provisions of the Draft Treaty are the due diligence obligations 
and the provisions for legal liability.61 Due diligence obligations build on the 
framework established by the UNGP (identification, prevention, monitoring 
and communicating) to include a more detailed set of responsibilities, including 
undertaking environmental and human rights impact assessments, carrying out 
consultations with relevant stakeholders, reporting on non-financial matters, 
and integrating human rights due diligence requirements across contractual 
relationships in supply chains.62 Unlike the UNGP, due diligence requirements 
are meant to become legally binding by means of national law, as State parties 
need to introduce national procedures to ensure compliance.63 The emphasis 
59  Ibid. Art. 3(3). According to Carlos Lopez, a reference to treaties or custom would make 
more sense than such a broad phrasing, C. Lopez, Towards an International Convention on 
Business and Human Rights (Part I) (2018), available at http://opiniojuris.org/2018/07/23/
towards-an-international-convention-on-business-and-human-rights-part-i/ (last visited 
27 August 2019).
60  See for example, the provision of an International Fund for Victims, designed to provide 
legal and financial aid to victims, Revised Draft, supra note 56, Art. 13(7). The focus 
on victims has been a point of critique, with the argument that the state cannot rely 
solely on regimes of liability that place the burden on victims. Instead, it should have 
a proactive role in controlling or preventing abuses in the spheres where it facilitates or 
shapes business activity, see G. Quijano, A new draft Business and Human Rights treaty 
and a promising direction of travel (2019), available at https://www.business-humanrights.
org/en/a-new-draft-business-and-human-rights-treaty-and-a-promising-direction-of-
travel (last visited 1 December 2019).
61  Ibid. Art. 5, 6.
62  Revised Draft, supra note 56, Art. 5. A point of critique has been the reference to 
businesses’ “[...] contractual relationships [...]”, as opposed to the broader “[...] business 
relationships [...]” of the UNGP. This narrow phrasing could prove an additional obstacle 
in imposing human rights due diligence obligations on parent companies. Indicatively, 
see R. Meeran, The Revised Draft: Access to Judicial Remedy for Victims of Multinationals‘ 
Abuse (2019), available at https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/the-revised-draft-
access-to-judicial-remedy-for-victims-of-multinationals-abuse (last visited 1 December 
2019).  
63  Revised Draft, supra note 56, Art. 5(4). The Revised Draft softened the phraseology 
of the Zero Draft, which required national procedures to enforce (rather than ensure) 
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on the role of public authority is consistent with rights-based approaches’ 
understanding of the nature of the corporation as a partially public entity. Ruggie, 
however, laments in this renewed approach the rendering of due diligence into 
“[...] a standard of results [...]”, requiring companies “[...] to prevent [...]”, rather 
than “[...] seek to prevent [...]”.64
The Draft further requires States to elaborate a regime of legal liability 
for human rights violations occurring in the context of business activities. 
More specifically, parent companies could be liable for the actions or omissions 
of natural or legal persons with which they have contractual relationships, if 
parent companies “[...] sufficiently control[] or supervise[] the relevant activity 
that caused the harm, or should foresee or should have foreseen risks of human 
rights violations or abuses in the conduct of business activities [...]”.65 It is beyond 
the scope of the present article to discuss the ramifications of this provision. It 
suffices to say that a crucial question would be the extent to which this provision 
enables the piercing of the corporate veil. Furthermore, the Draft lists a number 
of criminal offences (including war crimes and forced labor) for which State 
parties must provide a regime of criminal, civil, or administrative liability of 
legal persons.66
In the context of the discussion of the foundations and operationalization 
of human rights obligations for corporations, of particular interest is Ruggie’s 
brief, albeit foundational, critique of the Draft Treaty regarding the issues of 
scale and complexity of the corporate form.67 Ruggie suggests that the scale of 
transnational business activity, which includes a vast number of suppliers as part 
of  supply chains, is such that successful regulation of corporate behavior requires 
instrumentalities of implementation matching the magnitude of the task. While 
Ruggie does not state that such an implementation dynamic is impossible, there 
is an implicit assumption that a uniform, centric, and static solution as that of an 
international treaty is ill-equipped to deal with the complexity of transnational 
compliance.
64  J. G. Ruggie, ‘Comments on the “Zero Draft” Treaty on Business & Human Rights’, 
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (2018) available at https://www.business-
humanrights.org/en/comments-on-the-%E2%80%9Czero-draft%E2%80%9D-treaty-
on-business-human-rights (last visited 27 August 2019) [Ruggie, Comments on the Zero 
Draft].
65  Revised Draft, supra note 56, Art. 6(6).
66  Revised Draft, supra note 56, Art. 6(7).
67  In that sense it differs from the reformist spirit of the critical comments made by Cassel, 
At Last: A Draft UN Treaty on Business and Human Rights, supra note 57 and Lopez, 
Towards an International Convention on Business and Human Rights, supra note 59.
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business activities.68 Other commentators go further, suggesting that it is already 
from the outset questionable whether a legally binding instrument of public 
international law is capable of effective protection against corporate human 
right abuses.69 Instead, corporate accountability should perhaps be based 
on national tort, criminal, contract, regulatory law, and the self-regulatory 
dynamics of corporations themselves, following the soft obligations of the 
UNGP. The scepticism towards human-rights centrism and the highlighting 
of social complexity as the foundational condition of postmodernity finds its 
theoretical pinnacle in the conceptualization of rights enforcement through 
societal constitutionalism.
II. Societal Constitutionalism: CSR Codes as Transnational,  
 Civil Constitutions
The major task in operationalizing societal constitutionalism, especially 
in the field of the economy, is to exert such a level of external pressures on social 
systems that trigger forces of self-limitation to develop within their internal 
processes.70 The role of the law in this process is to facilitate the permeability of 
private institutional structures to deliberation and contestation.71 In turn, this 
accentuates the importance of soft law and regulation that may open corporate 
activity to the scrutiny of global civil society and trigger self-regulatory dynamics 
as a reaction to potential reputational sanctions. Therefore, the UNGP, the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the earlier Global Compact, 
legislation imposing transparency obligations regarding human rights and 
68  See, in this spirit, the explanation of the American vote against the resolution, seeing 
a binding treaty as competing to the UNGP, S. Townley for the US Delegation, 
Explanation of Vote: A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 on BHR Legally-Binding Instrument: Statement 
by the Delegation of the United States of America (26 June 2014), available at https://
geneva.usmission.gov/2014/06/26/proposed-working-group-would-undermine-efforts-
to-implement-guiding-principles-on-business-and-human-rights/ (last visited 27 August 
2019).
69  P. Thielborger & T. Ackermann, A Treaty on Enforcing Human Rights Against Business: 
Closing the Loophole or Getting Stuck in a Loop’, 24 Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies (2017) 1, 43, 72.
70  Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism and the Politics of the Common’, supra note 52, 7.
71  C. Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-regulation and Democracy (2002) 37-40.
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environmental impact of corporate activity,72 as well as civil regulations73 are 
examples in this direction. Indeed, Ruggie stresses the importance of informal 
cooperation, responsiveness, and public-private partnerships in this “[...] new 
governance [...]”.74 The intertwining of international non-binding instruments 
and private corporate codes of conduct is projected as potentially leading to 
transnational, functional equivalents to the classical constitutional state.75 The 
abstract norms entailed by non-binding instruments serve as starting points for 
the generation of intracorporate norms, which then produce actual standards 
for internal and external review. This indicates a reversal of the qualities of 
law, whereby the private ordering of corporations adopts characteristics of 
hard law, while state norms maintain a soft character.76 A central role in this 
transformation is attributed to the learning pressures exerted to corporations, 
meaning the internal changes induced by external constraints, such as the 
abovementioned reputational sanctions.77 The role of legislation or non-binding 
instruments is therefore to enable these pressures by harnessing existent social 
dynamics, thus steering intracorporate norms toward transnational public 
policy.78 This corresponds to the fundamental motive of reflexive law being 
reciprocal adaptation, rather than direct intervention.79
72  See for example, the 2014/95/EU Directive on nonfinancial reporting, the UK Modern 
Slavery Act of 2015, and the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 
imposing soft obligations of reporting.
73  See D. Vogel, ‘The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct’, 49 Business & 
Society (2010) 1, 68.
74  J. G. Ruggie, ‘Global Governance and New Governance Theory: Lessons from Business 
and Human Rights’, 20 Global Governance (2014), 5, 9 [Global Governance and New 
Governance].
75  Indicatively, O. Dilling, M. Herberg & G. Winter, ‘Introduction: Private Accountability 
in a Globalising World’ in O. Dilling, M. Herberg & G. Winter (eds), Responsible 
business: Self-Governance and Law in Transnational Economic Transactions, 2008; G. 
Teubner, ‘Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of “Private” and “Public” 
Corporate Codes of Conduct’, 18 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2011) 2, 617 
[Teubner, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs?].
76  Teubner, ‘Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs?’, supra note 75, 630.
77  Ibid., 635.
78  Ibid., 637.
79  According to this perspective direct, top-down regulation faces a regulatory trilemma 
of under-effectiveness, over-effectiveness, or regulatory capture. See G. Teubner, ‘After 
Legal Instrumentalism? Strategic Models of Post-Regulatory Law’ in Gunther Teubner 
(ed.), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (Walter de Gruyter 1986), 310-312 [Teubner, 
After Legal Instrumentalism].
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Therefore, according to such an approach of constitutionalization of the 
economic subfields, effective operationalization of the corporate responsibility 
to respect human rights depends on the corporate uptake of social norms – 
following the guidance provided by public instruments. CSR codes become 
then an integral part of international private regulation and of global legal 
pluralism. Corporate codes institutionalize a form of corporate self-governance 
that permeates – at different levels – supply chains by applying to contractors and 
potentially sub-contractors.80 Teubner sees in these codes and in their potential 
to bind private actors emerging “[...] civil constitutions [...]”.81According to his 
analysis, like state constitutions, private regulations employ mechanisms of self-
restraint to reduce intrusions on individuals. In that direction, the codes appear 
to break with the state-fixation of human rights and recognize explicitly a direct 
effect of human rights on private actors.82 The enforcement of these human 
rights obligations does not fall solely upon the national courts, but is instead a 
result of a nexus of actions that involve public interest litigation,83 corporate self-
regulation,84 and external monitoring and multi-faceted control by civil society 
80  Most codes apply to the first tier of the supply chain but the use of CSR codes by TNCs 
further down the supply chain has steadily increased. UNCTAD, Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Global Value Chains (2012), 2-4.
81  G. Teubner, ‘The Corporate Codes of Multinationals: Company Constitutions Beyond 
Corporate Governance and Co-Determination’ in R. Nickel (ed.), Conflict of Laws and 
Laws of Conflict in Europe and Beyond: Patterns of Supranational and Transnational 
Juridification, 2009, 204 [Teubner, Corporate Codes of Multinationals]. Precisely because 
of this analysis, CSR is not seen as management ethics or as a moralization of corporate 
actors, contra R. Shamir, ‘The age of responsibilization: On market-embedded morality’, 
37 Economy and Society (2008) 1, 1, according to whom CSR corresponds to a morality 
grounded in neoliberal epistemology that dissolves the distinction between society and 
economy See also C. Hackett, On the Moral Landscape of Corporate Obligations Within 
International Law.
82  G. Teubner, ‘Corporate Codes in the Varieties of Capitalism: How Their Enforcement 
Depends on the Differences among Production Regimes’ (2017) 24 Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies (2017) 1, 81, 96 [Teubner, Corporate Codes in the Varieties of 
Capitalism].
83  See for example, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, [2013] (US Supreme 
Court) and in general the use of the Alien Tort Statute in the U.S.
84  See the example of Apple Inc. and its organizing principles and Code of Conduct, its 
values that are addressed universally to workers and suppliers through education and 
socialization programs, as well as its power to settle disputes, L. C. Backer, ‘Transnational 
Corporations‘ Outward Expression of Inward Self-Constitution: The Enforcement of 
Human Rights by Apple, Inc’, 20 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2013) 2, 805, 
832-847.
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actors.85 This control could take different forms, including ethical shareholder 
activism,86 organization of public campaigns, and, perhaps most importantly, 
institutionalized forms of monitoring and certification. An example of the 
latter is offered by the international organization Fair Labor Association, which 
integrates labor rights in its Code of Conduct, it monitors participating companies 
and ensures the transparency of their operations, and it offers accreditation 
to companies’ compliance programs.87 Similarly, certification bodies such 
as FLOCERT certify Fair Trade standards that aim, among other things, to 
increase investment in social, economic, and environmental development. It is, 
then, through a recourse to consumer preferences and priorities (“[...] consumer 
politicisation [...]” according to Teubner) that corporate actors are incentivized 
to uptake human rights obligations, especially with regards to socio-economic 
rights in the developing world. Such complex processes of transnational law, 
whereby private regulatory bodies without legal or constitutional authority 
impose norms, oversee, and evaluate the performance of private economic 
actors regarding goals of social responsibility, highlight the autonomy of legal 
operations from statehood and the emergence of obligations that are not strictly 
speaking derived, but only inspired by standards set by public authority.88 Another 
possible avenue for enhancing and diversifying the enforcement of human rights 
obligations under CSR Codes is to render corporate codes judicially enforceable. 
This could be by means of national private law, especially, but not exclusively, 
through a recourse to competition law and the possibility to draw undue 
competitive advantages from advertised supposedly socially responsible practices 
85  Teubner, ‘Corporate Codes in the Varieties of Capitalism’, supra note 82, 97.
86  I.e., NGOs gaining status and voice within corporations through share ownership.
87  The vagueness of primary rules set either by international bodies or by private regulators 
and civil society leads to a jurisgenerative role of regulatory intermediaries who, through 
their interpretations of rights (such as freedom of association) shape their concrete content. 
SeeP. Paiement, ‘Jurisgenerative role of auditors in transnational labor governance’, 13 
Regulation & Governance (2018) 2, 125, 280.
88  According to J. Ellis, ‘Constitutionalization of Nongovernmental Certification Programs’, 
20 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2013) 2, 501, 1035, 1041-1042, certification 
programs “rely on perceptions of their legitimacy and credibility”. This underscores that 
the constitution is understood not as a body politic, but as communications. 
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that do not correspond to reality.89 This has been a recent object of study and 
analysis in private law and legal theory.90
Following such a theoretical analysis that aims to elevate the status of CSR 
beyond voluntarism, without at the same time directly confronting shareholder 
primacy or returning to mandatory state regulation of corporate behavior, a 
number of developing States have created binding CSR obligations with direct 
relevance for social rights. Most strikingly, India’s Companies Act of 2013 
requires large companies to spend at least 2% of their profits in pursuance of 
their CSR policy, with preference given to the areas in direct proximity with its 
operations.91 In the first years of after the implementation of the Act, companies 
have been predominantly directed their CSR spending on health and education.92 
However, it is important to highlight that, in line with the urge of the reflexive 
approach to avoid direct State intervention, this obligation is not followed by 
sanctions other than the obligation to justify non-compliance (comply-or-
explain-approach), which in turn makes sanctions dependent on the outcry of 
89  See also, the famous case Kasky v. Nike, Inc. 27 Cal. 4th 939 (2002), cert. granted, 123 
S. Ct. 817, and cert. dismissed, 123 S. Ct. 2254 (2003), where an activist brought a 
lawsuit against Nike Inc. for false advertising and unfair competition resulting from its 
advertisements about the treatment of its workers in supply chains. Nike Inc. paid an out-
of-court settlement to the Fair Labor Association. In that direction, even though eventually 
settled, the Lidl case, Verbraucherzentrale Hamburg v. Lidl Dienstleistung GmbH & Co 
KG, LG Heilbronn, 21.04.2010 - 21 O 42/10. According to Anna Beckers, an example 
of an instrument in this direction is Article 2(d) of the EU Consumer Sales Directive, 
which makes it possible to enforce public declarations that traders use in marketing, 
insofar as these characterize the product. See generally, A. Beckers, Enforcing Corporate 
Social Responsibility Codes: On global Self-Regulation and National Private Law, 2015, as 
well as the positivist analysis of M. Torrance, ‘Persuasive Authority Beyond the State: A 
Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Corporate Social Responsibility Norms as Legal 
Reasons Within Positive Legal Systems’, 12 German Law Journal (2011) 8, 1573. This 
discourse is also supported by theoretical accounts that aim to go beyond the positivistic 
discussion on CSR’s bindingness, conceptualizing it as a space for “[...] compromise 
between incommensurable logics of action”, K. H. Eller, ‘Private governance of global 
value chains from within: Lessons from and for transnational law’, 8 Transnational Legal 
Theory (2017) 3, 296, 317.
90  For a series of articles debating the ideal way of maximizing the regulatory effect of CSR 
Codes, see Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 24 (2017).
91  Companies Act 2013, sec 135(5).
92  According to KPMG, ‘India’s CSR reporting survey 2017’ (Jan 2018), available at https://
assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/in/pdf/2018/02/CSR-Survey-Report.pdf (last 
visited 17 December 2019), compliance is robust and findings are encouraging regarding 
both CSR spending and reporting.
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civil society and the courts of public opinion.93 In Mauritius, a similar – and this 
time sanctionable – CSR obligation was legislated, whereby corporations should 
contribute the 2% of their chargeable income to a CSR Fund to be dedicated 
to CSR activities.94 In South Africa, a country famous for the constitutional 
recognition of the horizontal effect of human rights, CSR provisions have also 
been enshrined in legislation for specific sectors of the economy. For example, 
the South African Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act sets as 
one of its objectives to ensure that “[...] holders of mining and production rights 
contribute towards the socio-economic development of areas in which they 
operate [...]”.95 Even softer forms of legislated CSR, where there is no mechanism 
of implementation, can be found in China and Indonesia.96 These initiatives 
maintain a distance from both a state-enforced paradigm of corporate human 
rights obligations and from the transnational, deterritorialized communicative 
networks that constitute the fundament of obligations within the paradigm 
societal constitutionalism. Yet, insofar as sanctions are dismissed as an option 
and the companies enjoy a broad margin of choice regarding the target of their 
CSR contributions, such legislative initiatives can arguably be seen as the type of 
external constraints that aim to produce internal corporate change, eventually 
reaching to the core of corporate culture.
93  Companies Act 2013, sec 135(5).
94  Interestingly, however, according to Daniel Kinderman, ‘Time for a Reality Check: 
Is Business Willing to Support a Smart Mix of Complementary Regulation in Private 
Governance?’, 35 Policy and Society (2017) 1, 29, the CSR clause was introduced as part 
of a package-deal that involved cutting the corporate tax rate from 25% to 15%.
95  Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 2002, sec. 2(i). From a sociological 
perspective, according to Maha Rafi Atal, the reception of the corporate welfare and 
service provision programs by the workers ranges between their rejection as a continuation 
of apartheid-style paternalism and their endorsement as part of companies’ obligations. 
According to the same research, corporate managers framed their CSR programs as part 
of a wider project to combat labour resistance, including strikes. M. R. Atal, ‘White 
capital: Corporate social responsibility and the limits of transformation in South Africa’, 
4 The Extractive Industries and Society (2017) 4, 735, 738-740.
96  M. Yan, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility vs. Shareholder Value Maximization: Through 
the Lens of Hard and Soft Law’, Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
No 280/2018 (2018) 25-26.
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D. Conclusions: Synergies, Divergences, and Social   
 Rights Between the Distribution Imperatives of   
 Sufficiency and Quality
How to navigate between these different approaches? Is it possible to 
imagine a synergetic effect leading to a more enhanced human rights protection, 
despite their radically different theoretical underpinnings? They both lend 
themselves in support of human rights obligations applying to corporate actors. 
Yet, even though both approaches recognize the increasing incapacity of State 
institutions alone to mitigate the effects of globalizing corporate power, they 
diverge greatly on the question how the centrifugal dynamics of the economic 
system are to be addressed. Rights-based approaches cling on a Kantian idea of 
globalization of public law as a result of a legalization of international politics. 
There is a latent belief in the idea of a just global legal order, mediated through 
binding international agreements. The answer to the disjunction between the 
globalization of corporate power and the weakening of State institutions is a 
constitutionalized global polity, a constitutionalized international law.97 This –
perhaps overly – optimistic stance regarding the possibilities of politicization of 
international law within international institutions dominated by powerful capital-
exporting States is contrasted by the postmodern scepticism of systems theory 
that sees in world society an ensemble of highly fragmented and contradictory 
processes, wherein politics has lost its formerly leading role and such top-down 
approaches are bound to fail. According to societal constitutionalism, societies 
have an informal constitutionality that is not centered on States98 and it is precisely 
on these processes of partial constitutionalization that normative arguments 
should focus. It would not only be misplaced to expect the globalization of 
autonomous law through centralized global governance. It could also potentially 
adversely impact on the autopoietic processes of constitutionalization initiated 
through learning pressures. Indeed, the medium of the law should restrain itself 
to the role of the facilitator of the permeability of private structures to this type 
of learning pressures, realizing thusly its own self-reflexion.
97  G. Teubner, ‘Constitutionalizing Polycontexturality’, 20 Social & Legal Studies (2011) 2, 
210, 210-211. See also J. Klabbers, A. Peters & G. Ulfstein, The constitutionalization of 
international law, 2009.
98  C. Thornhill, ‘Constitutional Law from the Perspective of Power: A Response to Gunther 
Teubner’, 20 Social & Legal Studies (2011) 2, 244 [Thornhill, Constitutional Law].
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This conscious divergence99 of approaches embedded in transnational 
legal theory and the normative project of societal constitutionalism from ideas 
of a constitutionalized global polity stems from a deeper mistrust of centralized 
public authority – both due to its limited resources and its latent potential 
for overreaching and colonizing social spheres. However, in a moment of 
increasing international fragmentation, when forces of backlash against most 
institutionalized forms of international cooperation or supranational unity are 
gaining ground continuously, the fear of an all-engulfing State that threatens 
to annex the entirety of the Social seems misplaced. As Chris Thornhill has 
insightfully suggested, invoking the example of fascist European States of the 
1930s, totalitarian tendencies are actually supported by a model of “[...] weak 
statehood [...]” that rests on the colonization of the Social by co-opted private 
actors in the peripheries of government.100 In a world of ever-increasing corporate 
power, the priority of a normative project of socio-legal transformation cannot 
be the conditions that enhance an – already existing – self-realization of the 
autopoietic economic system through, for example, mechanisms of corporate 
self-governance and industry self-regulation. Instead, the goal must be the 
regulatory transformations that will allow for the curbing of this power in the 
face of public considerations.
Even though the descriptive aspect of societal constitutionalism, devoid of 
the transcendental and inherently arbitrary invocations of natural law, retains 
an explanatory power, its normative aspect risks indulging the view of a self-
adjusting, self-regulating society, with only a limited role for public authority. 
The dependence of social constitutionalization on market mechanisms (if 
one only thinks of examples such as certification, accreditation, general 
consumer preferences, etc.) carries the risk of a colonization of any emerging 
constitution by economics. This translates in an institutionalization of dynamics 
of inequality, even if the inclusionary aspect of human rights requires the 
openness of functional systems to all members of society. This is because, if the 
99  Approaches with practical orientation are more likely to appreciate possible synergies 
in the frame of the common goal of imposing rights obligations on corporations. See 
B. Choudhury, ‘Balancing Soft and Hard Law for Business and Human Rights’, 67 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2018) 4, 961, placing theemphasis on 
‘harder’ law rather than a binding treaty or O. K. Osuji & U. L. Obibuaku, ‘Rights and 
Corporate Social Responsibility: Competing or Complementary Approaches to Poverty 
Reduction and Socioeconomic Rights?’, 136 Journal of Business Ethics (2016) 2, 329, 
suggesting CSR should be the legal translation of broad human right commitments into 
concrete programs.
100  Thornhill, ‘Constitutional Law’, supra note 98, 246.
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access of the participating individuals to a system is subject to the translation 
of these individuals into semantic artefacts of a code oriented toward profit-
maximization, then the different economic capacities of individuals translate in 
differentiated access. Simply put, only small parts of the global population (but 
perhaps significant parts of the global market) can steer corporations toward Fair 
Trade certification. Therefore, even if the outcome of such a process might lead, 
for example, to increasing protection of social rights in the developing world, it 
comes at the price of the absence of participation of precisely those individuals 
that are supposed to benefit from the enjoyment of the rights. It comes to them 
as a gift endowed by the anonymized processes of globalized capitalism and the 
change of the consumption discourses in places far away. Harder laws regarding 
required CSR contributions, despite their immediate positive effect, fall within 
the same paradigm, drawing the critique of being a “[...] legislation of corporate 
philanthropy [...]”.101 This de-politicization and de-localization effectuated by 
such a transnational, horizontal effect of human rights disrupts the delicate 
balance between the imperatives of democracy and rights that supposedly rests 
in the co-originality of public and private autonomy.102
On the other hand, rights-based approaches, in their persistence for legally 
binding obligations,103 approach further what Jacques Rancière characterizes as 
a form of visibility of equality, derived from the inscription of human rights in 
words.104 Setting aside questions of philosophical foundations and the claims 
of a universal morality, from the moment these rights are inscribed (as in the 
case of a treaty), they enable their addressees to “[...] make something out of 
that inscription [...]”.105 This both recognizes the individuals subject to corporate 
power as autonomous agents, rather than as parts of anonymous communicative 
processes, and it enables processes of politicization through contested 
101  See R. G. Pillay, ‘The Limits to Self-Regulation and Voluntarism: From Corporate Social 
Responsibility to Corporate Accountability’, 99 Amicus Curiae (2014), 10, 12, according 
to whom corporations could be paying only a living wage to employees or engage in 
massive lay-offs and still be considered as socially responsible if they make the required 
contributions.
102  J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (1996), 121.
103  Ruggie calls them legal formalists, J. G. Ruggie, ‘Comments on Human Rights Obligations 
of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? ’ (2014), available at https://
www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/ruggie-comment-surya-deva-
david-bilchitz.pdf (last visited 02 September 2019).
104  J. Rancière, ‘Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’, 103 South Atlantic Quarterly 
(2004) 2-3, 297, 303.
105  Ibid.
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interpretations of the extent of corporate obligations. Indeed, social rights, 
precisely because of their role in sheltering certain fundamentals of existence 
from market allocations require a type of entrenchment that is immune to the 
vagaries of the market.106 To the extent that social rights mandate a certain 
unquestionability about a minimum of social solidarity, their dependence – as 
societal constitutionalism would have it – on mechanisms of reflexivity subject 
to market capture and the dynamics of a volatile consumer society appears to 
destabilize such a conceptual foundation.
However, this position needs further nuancing as well. The quest to 
entrench social rights precisely as the sheltering of “[...] minimums of existence 
[...]”107 reflects the sufficiency imperative of distribution, which, as Samuel 
Moyn convincingly shows, can easily coexist with significant socio-economic 
inequalities.108 Sufficiency guarantees a floor of protection against insufficiency, 
but not a ceiling on inequality, remaining uncritical of societal hierarchies. 
Sufficiency might be a more immediate priority in certain contexts, such as 
in developing countries. Yet, if social rights are to be conceived in a way that 
equality and not only sufficiency is addressed, then the inscription of human 
rights obligations of corporations is only a first step. Deeper changes in the 
relationship of law to the political economy are required, including changes in 
corporate governance that challenge shareholder primacy and are indeed capable 
of shifting the priorities of corporations toward social responsibility. From such 
a perspective, it appears that the ultimate goal of societal constitutionalism to 
democratize the economy from within carries a certain potential for egalitarian 
aspirations that could possibly go beyond the regulation of only some minimum 
obligations through hard law. The open-endedness of societal constitutionalism 
could indeed enable transformative projects of democratization to sprout. 
Fleshing out and operationalizing the objective of triggering systemic self-
limitation needs, in this case, extensive reimagination in order to correspond 
to demands of democratic legitimacy and avoid market capture and the risk of 
institutionalizing socio-economic inequalities. Such a project of publicization 
of private actors would need to go further than the current framework of the 
106  See E. Christodoulidis, ‘Social Rights Constitutionalism: An Antagonistic Endorsement’, 
44 Journal of Law and Society (2017) 1, 123.
107  See Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights, supra note 15 and the development of a thin 
theory of the good, as well as J. Tasioulas, Minimum Core Obligations: Human Rights in 
the Here and Now, 2017, and the elaboration of the concept of minimum core obligations.
108  S. Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World, 2018.
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UNGP, possibly involving a more prescriptive approach from public authority in 
the regulation of both corporate conduct and corporate governance.109
These reflections lead to the tentative speculation that, while rights-
based approaches seem better equipped, at least in their practical orientation, 
to guarantee the minimum standards of social rights by imposing human 
rights obligations on corporations, a re-envisioned societal constitutionalism 
might hold more promise for the structural transformations that could elevate 
social rights beyond the moral demand of sufficiency. This is not to say that 
societal constitutionalism is the only approach in that regard; more traditional 
approaches along the lines of the welfare State could also be effective, although, 
contrary to societal constitutionalism, it remains a point of question the extent 
to which they could have transnational effect. If the goal of effectuating social 
rights is the fight against poverty and lack of access to institutions and resources, 
imposing human rights obligations through international law on corporations 
that have a significant impact on people’s lives around the world appears to be 
a necessary first step in attenuating the effects of their social power. Yet, if the 
goal is related to aspirations of equality then social rights are only part of the 
answer.110
109  An example in that direction could possibly be the inclusive ownership fund (IOF), a 
suggested employee ownership scheme in the UK that would transfer part of the ownership 
of a company to the employees, distribute dividend payments, and direct further dividends 
to a national fund for public services and welfare. See R. Syal, ‘Employees to be Handed 
Stake in Firms Under Labour Plan’, The Guardian (24 September 2018), available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/sep/23/labour-private-sector-employee-
ownership-plan-john-mcdonnell (last visited 02 September 2019).
110  Donaldson & Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, 
and Implications’, supra note 29, 83-84. This view is further legitimised by the fact that 
even strong defendants of property rights accept limitations to property rights. See, for 
example, Nozick’s example of the appropriation of the single waterhole in the desert and 
the worsening of the position of others. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, supra note 18, 
140.
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